Lee v. Prof’l Constr. Servs., 982 So. 2d 837 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
A Louisiana Court of Appeal barred a claim against an engineer because it was brought beyond the limitations of the statute of repose.
Plaintiffs sued the engineer for the improper design, fabrication, and construction of a radio communication antenna tower. The parties entered into the contract in 1998. Plaintiff discovered the alleged faults in 2005 and sued in 2006.
The statute limiting the timeframe within which a claimant may sue referred specifically to professional engineers. It was enacted in 2003. Plaintiffs first argued that a different statute applied to the contract in question. They claimed that the contract was one of warranty rather than one for engineering services and that a ten-year statute of repose period applied. The court disagreed. It found that the contract did not provide any guarantees by the engineer for his performance.
Next, plaintiffs argued that applying the 2003 statute to the contract retroactively would violate the
The court held the exception of preemption applied and dismissed plaintiffs’ claim.
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The defendant in this case hired plaintiff, the architect, to design a veterinary hospital. According to Article 6 of the contract between them, the architect was to retain all rights to the plans and drawings prepared for the project. After the relationship between the two began to spoil, the architect filed a formal copyright application for his plans with the U.S. Copyright Office. The owner and the architect eventually signed a termination agreement that said Article 6 was still in effect. Also, the agreement prohibited the owner to use any work solely produced by the architect.
Four years after signing the termination agreement, the architect saw the floor plan of the veterinary hospital and realized his copyright had been infringed. He filed a copyright infringement suit against the owner six years later. The trial court sided with the owner and found that the architect should have known about the infringement for more than three years because any “reasonably diligent person” in the architect’s position would have found out about it. So the court charged the architect with knowledge for more than three years and said he sued the owner too late – the period during which he could sue had passed. The trial court also determined that the owner had no rights in the plans and drawings filed with the copyright office.
The architect appealed. The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court and found that the facts were insufficient to conclude that a reasonable person in the architect’s position would have known of the copyright infringement. For example, the owner had responded to the architect’s written warning not to use his work by saying the plans had been discarded. The court also rejected the owner’s argument that the word “solely” in the termination agreement gave the architect notice. The termination agreement did not authorize the owner to use any copyrighted work.
The court of appeals also rejected the owner’s claim that he had an interest in any of the copyrighted materials because it constituted work for hire. The contract must expressly state “work for hire” for such interest to exist.
Many owners draft contracts with hired professionals and include the “work for hire” language. An architect should strike the language “word for hire” and include appropriate language in the contract to preserve the architect's copyright interest in the documents. At most, an architect should share ownership with the owner and not to give ownership rights to standard forms that have been developed over years. If an architect gives up ownership to the owner, the architect should include a provision that requires the owner to pay for any losses that result from the use of the documents outside the uses provided in the contract.
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In February, 2009, in Hardee v. McDowell, the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed a contractor's ability to shift liability under the South Carolina Uninsured Employer's Fund. The subcontractor worked on various job sites for the contractor. While the subcontractor presented the contractor with proof of insurance purporting to last a year, it turned out that the policy was cancelled a day before an employee was gravely injured.
The contractor sought reimbursement from the Uninsured Employer's Fund. The South Carolina Court of Appeals interpreted S.C. Code Section 42-1-415 to require a contractor to obtain proof of insurance from a subcontractor for each particular job for which the subcontractor is engaged to perform work.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, finding that a contractor must obtain proof of insurance for each job. In addition, the court clarified that a contractor must obtain proof of insurance every time the subcontractor is actually hired to perform work. Thus, if the contractor hires the subcontractor for a job in January, then for another one in February, the contractor must make sure the subcontractor has insurance coverage at the time of the February engagement.
This site and any information contained herein is intended for informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. Seek a competent attorney for advice on any legal matter.
A general contractor may enforce an indemnification clause against its subcontractor for the damages attributable to that subcontractor's negligence.
In Brooks v. Judlau Contr., Inc., 2008 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y. 2008), the Court of Appeals of New York interpreted a New York statute that stated, in essence, that a promise related to a construction contract meant to hold the promisee (the one to whom the promise is being made) not liable for injuries resulting from the promisee's or the promisee's agents' negligence was against public policy.
An ironworker was injured when he grabbed onto a perimeter safety cable installed by the general contractor and the cable came lose causing the worker to fall 18 feet to the pavement below. The worker sued the contractor, and the contractor brought a third-party claim against the subcontractor seeking indemnification for the damages attributable to the subcontractor's negligence.
The agreement between the subcontractor and contractor contained a provision that, according to the subcontractor, violated the New York statute because it purported to relieve the contractor of liability. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It noted that the contract provision did not violate the statute because the contractor only sought indemnification for another's negligence, not for contractor's own fault. The subcontractor, therefore, was liable to the contractor for any damages the contractor may have to pay for that did not result from the contractor's negligence but from the negligence of the subcontractor.
See Section 33-2-10 of the South Carolina Code of Laws Annotated which, like the New York statute, renders unenforceable and against public policy any attempts of avoiding liability for one own's negligence.
This site and any information contained herein is intended for informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. Seek a competent attorney for advice on any legal matter.